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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

KYLE STEVEN BOWER,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)

NO. 41336

)
)

CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2012-9274

)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

)

___________ )

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kyle Steven Bower asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2015, Unpublished Opinion No. 351 (Ct. App. February 13,
2015) (hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment
of Conviction, is in conflict with previous decisions of the Court of Appeals and not likely
in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court where the Court of
Appeals found that Mr. Bower's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion
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tp sever the c~arges related to two separate victims following after Mr. Bower was
charged with three sex offenses.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Kyle Steven Bower was charged, by superseding indictment, with two counts of
lewd concluct with a minor under sixteen and one count of sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen. (R., pp.19-21.) The conduct charged in counts one and three was alleged to
have occurred against K.B. 1 between 2011 and 2012, when she was between the ages
of 13 and 14 years old; the conduct charged in count two was alleged to have occurred
against J.B. 2 in 2004, when she was between the ages of 10 and 11 years old.
(R., p.20.) Count one, involving K.B., alleged "manual to genital and/or genital to genital
contact," while count two, involving J.B. alleged "manual to genital contact." (R., p.20.)
Count three, involving K.B., alleged "manual to breast contact." (R., p.20.)
Mr. Bower filed a Motion to Sever count two from counts one and three, asserting
that the facts and circumstances are "separate and apart from each other," the victims
are different, the incidents were alleged to have occurred years apart, and "[h]aving
these counts together will highly prejudice" Mr. Bower.

(R., p.39.) The district court

denied the Motion to Sever, concluding that "Defendant has failed to make a prima facie
showing that any of the factors identified by the Idaho appellate courts as justifying
severance are present in this case." (R., p.53.)
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K.B. is the biological daughter of Mr. Bower. (Tr., p.277, Ls.3-13.)
J.B. considered Mr. Bower to be her main father figure, as her biological father was
not involved in her early life, and although they never married, Mr. Bower and her
mother spent nine years together. (Tr., p.485, L.19 - p.487, L.21.)
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Following a jury trial, Mr. Bower was found guilty of all three counts. (Tr., p. 750,
L.6 - p.751, L.4.) Mr. Bower filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.295.) On appeal,
Mr. Bower contended the district court erred in denying his motion to sever where it

mistakenly considered the motion as one made under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it
is in the district court's discretion to grant or deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8,
which involves a legal determination of the propriety of joinder. (Appellant's Brief, pp.211.) The Idaho Court of Appeals found that Mr. Bower failed to present the motion to
sever under I.C.R. 8, but rather that it was brought pursuant to I.C.R. 14 in the district
court. (Opinion, pp.4-7.) As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that the issue was
not preserved for appellate review and affirmed the district court's order denying the
motion to sever under I.C.R. 14 (Opinion, pp.6-7.)
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ISSUE
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Bower's Judgment of Conviction not
likely in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and in conflict with
previous decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals?
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ARGUMENT
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirmin l Mr. Bower's Judgment Of Conviction Is
Not Likely In Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And Is In
Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Court Of Appeals

A.

Introduction

Mr. Bower asserts that the district court committed legal error when it denied his
motion to sever count two from counts one and three because they were improperly
joined.

In denying the motion, the district court considered the motion as one made

under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it is in the district court's discretion to grant or
deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8, which involves a legal determination of the
propriety of joinder.
On appeal, Mr. Bower contends that the district court should have considered his
motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that Mr. Bower's
argument under !.C.R. 8 was not preserved for appellate review. For the reasons stated
below, Mr. Bower asserts his motion to sever pursuant to !.C.R. 8 is properly before the
appellate court and the district court erred in denying his motion.

B.

The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Bower's Judgment Of
Conviction Is Not Likely In Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The Idaho
Supreme Court And Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The Idaho Court Of
Appeals
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only

"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court. I.A. R. 118(b ). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered
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though.

Rule 11 S(b) lists five factors which must serve as the starting point in

evaluating any petition for review:
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression;
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and
5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.
I.A.R. 118(b).
As is set forth in detail below, the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is not
likely in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and likely in
conflict with decisions of the Idaho Court of Appeals where the Court of Appeals found
that Mr. Bower's trial attorney filed his motion to sever under I.C.R. 14 and not I.C.R. 8,
and therefore, Mr. Bower's claim under I.C.R. 8 was not preserved for appellate review.

See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277-278 (2003) (recognizing that an issue is
preserved for appellate review where the claim raised on appeal is "substantially the
same" or sufficiently overlaps with the issue raised in the trial court.); State v. Voss, 152
Idaho 148 (Ct. App. 2011) (same).

C.

If This Court Grants Mr. Bower's Petition For Review, He Asserts That The Court
Of Appeals Erred In Determining That Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Two
Charges Was Not Preserved For Review
On appeal, Mr. Bower argued that "the district court committed legal error when it

denied his motion to sever count two from counts one and three because they were
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improperly joined. In denying the motion, the district court mistakenly considered the
motion as one made under Idaho Criminal Rule 14, which it is in the district court's
discretion to grant or deny, rather than Idaho Criminal Rule 8, which involves a legal
determination of the propriety of joinder." (Appellant's Brief, p.2.) Mr. Bower argued
that if the district court had reviewed the motion to sever under I.C.R. 8, his conviction
would have been reverse and case remanded back for separate, new trials.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-11.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
order denying Mr. Bower's motion to sever.

(Opinion, p.1.)

The Court of Appeals

concluded that Mr. Bower had not preserved his claim that his motion to sever pursuant
to I.C.R. 8 should have been granted for appellate review because that claim was not
raised in the district court. (Opinion, pp.4-7.) Mr. Bower asserts that the district court
erred in failing to address this merits of his claim on appeal.
As a general rule, issues not raised in the lower court may not be considered for
the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195 (1992). "Where a party
appeals the decision of an intermediate appellate court, the appellant may not raise
issues that are different from issues presented to the intermediate appellate court."
State v. Voss, 152 Idaho 148, 150 Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho

267, 275 (2003)).

"An issue is different if it is not substantially same or does not

sufficiently overlap with an issue before the trial court." Id.
Mr. Bower asserts that the Idaho Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider his
claim that his motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) should have been granted
because the issues raised in his motion to sever in the trial court are substantially the
same and sufficiently overlap with the claims Mr. Bower raised on direct appeal.
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Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) provides:
Two (2) or more offenses may be charged on the same complaint,
indictment or information and a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based
on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or transactions
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
I.C.R. 8(a). Claims brought under I.C.R. 8(a) are subject to free review by the Court.

State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 (2007) ("Whether a court improperly joined offenses
pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of law, over which this Court exercises free review.")
(citations omitted). Contrarily, "[p]arties properly joined under I.C.R. 8(b) may be
severed under !.C.R. 14 if it appears that joint trial would be prejudicial, and the
defendant has the burden of showing such prejudice." State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222,
226 (1985). Motions to sever brought pursuant to I.C.R. 14 are subjected to an abuse is
discretion standard.
In his motion to sever, Mr. Bower sought to sever count two from counts one and
three, asserting that the facts and circumstances are "separate and apart from each
other," the victims are different, the incidents were alleged to have occurred years apart,
and "[h]aving these counts together will highly prejudice" Mr. Bower.

(R., p.39.)

Mr. Bower acknowledges that of the four reasons for the motion to sever, one of those
reasons is not subject to Rule 8 analysis, namely, "Having these counts together will
highly prejudice defendant." Rather, the determination of prejudices is relevant to the
review of a motion to sever brought under I.C.R. 14. However, the other three reasons
for granting the motion to sever are relevant to a determination on whether to grant a
motion to sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a), which looks to whether the offenses charged,
"whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are based on the same act or transaction or
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on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a
common scheme or plan." See I.C.R. 8(a). Moreover, during the hearing on the motion
to sever, the State cited directly cited to I.C.R. 8(a), arguing,
Obviously, Idaho Criminal Rule 8 provides for the State to join multiple
offenses in one indictment. There are - - according to Idaho Rule 8, there
are a couple of different situations that must be present in order to meet
that criteria. Specifically, that being that they arise from the same act or
transactions, they're connected together, or they constitute part of a
common scheme or plan
It's the State's position in this case that, in fact, this constitutes part
of a common scheme or plan and hence the reason that they were joined
together.
(Tr., p.2, L.16

p.3, L.2.)

Then, in response, defense counsel for Mr. Bower

distinguished the cases cited by the State. (Tr., p.8, L.10 -- p.9, L.9.)
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is apparent that Mr. Bower's motion to
sever pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) was raised in the district court and preserved for appellate
review. Alternatively, at the very least, there is substantial overlap between arguments
made in support of I.C.R. 8 and I.C.R. 14 such that this Court should review the merits
of Mr. Bower's I.C.R. 8 motion to sever.

D.

If This Court Grants Mr. Bower's Petition For Review 1 He Asserts District Court
Erred When It Denied Mr. Bower's Motion To Sever Because The Conduct
Alleged In Count Two Was Not Based On The Same Act Or Transaction Or Part
Of A "Common Scheme Or Plan" To Commit The Conduct Alleged In Counts
One And Three
In Field, this Court explained, "Cases discussing common plans have focused on

whether the offenses were one continuing action or whether the offenses have sufficient
common elements including the type of sexual abuse, the circumstances under which
the abuse occurred, and the age of the victims."
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Field, 144 Idaho at 565.

The

defendant in Field was charged with having manual-to-genital contact with a seven year
o!d girl in 2003, and having rubbed the buttocks of a 17 year old girl in 2001. Id. at 566.
Before the district court, the State argued that joinder was appropriate because "the
offenses constitute a common scheme because Field asked the individual girls to come
near him, began to 'innocently' touch them and then put his hand down their pants." Id.
On appeal, the State added an additional reason that joinder was appropriate: "that
Field had a plan to take advantage of underage girls that come into his home to babysit
or be babysat." Id.
In rejecting the State's argument and finding joinder improper under Rule 8, this
Court

reasoned,

"the

incidents

occurred

at

different

times,

under

different

circumstances, and involved different parties with significantly different ages." Id. This
Court further explained, "These separate acts did not constitute part of a common
scheme or plan. There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P .... [or] against
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later." Id.

This Court noted that while

both victims were minors, they "had different ages (one was a young child, the other
was almost an adult), the type of sexual contact was different (digital vaginal penetration
and the rubbing of buttocks), and the incidents occurred two years apart," while the
similarities, "that both girls were only temporarily in the household, that the acts
occurred in Field's home, and that the abuse began with 'innocent' touching" were
"insufficient to prove a common scheme or plan." Id. at 566-67.
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Interpreting the similar Federal Criminal Rule of Procedure 8, 3 the Ninth Circuit
has explained that its "common scheme or plan" language requires an examination of
"whether '[c]omission of one of the offenses [ ]either depended upon [ ]or necessarily
led to the commission of the other; proof of the one act [ ]either constituted [ ]or
depended upon proof of the other."' United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d 565, 574 (9th
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Halper, 590 F.2d 422, 429 (2d Cir. 1978)) (brackets
in original).
In State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010), interpreting the term "common
scheme or plan" in assessing the admissibility of other acts evidence under Rule 404(b)
in a lewd conduct prosecution, this Court provided guidance as to the meaning and
scope of the term "common scheme or plan." Johnson was charged with three counts
of lewd conduct, alleged to have been committed against his daughter when she was
six to seven years old. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 666. The charges concerned allegations
that Johnson had engaged the victim in manual-to-genital contact, oral-to-genital
contact, and attempted sexual intercourse through genital-to-genital contact. Id. Over
Johnson's objection, the State was allowed to introduce evidence that Johnson "had
molested his younger sister when she was approximately eight years old and he was
between fifteen and sixteen," with such abuse consisting mainly of "Johnson exposing
himself to his sister and requesting that she expose herself to him," with one instance of
manual-to-genital contact. Id. at 667.

3

The key difference between Idaho's Rule 8 and the federal version is that the plain
language of the federal rule is far more liberal, allowing for joinder when the offenses
"are of the same or similar character" even if they are not based on the same act or
transaction or part of a common scheme or plan. Compare F.R.Cr.P. 8(a) with I.C.R.
8(a).
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This Court first acknowledged its recent decision in Grist, noting, "It reiterated
that bad acts may only be admitted 'if relevant to prove ... a common scheme or plan
embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of
one tends to establish the other, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident."'

Id. at 668 (quoting Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-55) (emphasis in original).

Summarizing its holding, this Court explained, "In other words, at a minimum, there
must be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual
misconduct has occurred with children in the past." Id.
In allowing the evidence to be presented, the district court had found three
characteristics that provided a link between the prior acts and the pending charges: "(1)
both victims were about seven to eight years old; (2) both victims viewed Johnson as an
'authority figure' because he was an older brother or father; [and] (3) both courses of
conduct involved Johnson requesting the victim to touch his penis."

Id. at 669.

In

finding admission of the prior acts improper, this Court explained, "These similarities,
however, are sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a 'common scheme or plan' in
Johnson's behavior. The facts that the two victims in this case are juvenile females and
that Johnson is a family member are precisely what make these incidents unfortunately
quite ordinary." Id.
In State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1 (2013), this Court summarized the rule it clarified in
Grist and affirmed in Johnson as follows:
[T]o be admissible under Rule 404(b ), evidence of prior misconduct must
show more than a superficial similarity to the nature and details of the
charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's charged and
uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the
charged offense.
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Joy, 155 Idaho at 10 (emphasis added).
No evidence was offered that the alleged abuse of J.B. in 2004 "was planned as
part of a course of conduct leading up to" the alleged abuse of K.B. in 2011 and 2012.
It would be illogical to conclude that the alleged abuse in 2004 of a different victim of a
different age in a different manner and with a different relationship to Mr. Bower was
perpetrated in order to commit the later alleged abuse in 2011 and 2012. See Field,
144 Idaho at 566 ("There is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P .... [or] against
someone he would be 'babysitting' two years later").
Assuming that it is appropriate to go beyond the interpretation of the "common
scheme or plan" language from Rule 8 provided by this Court in Field, or the similar
interpretation of "common scheme or plan" for purposes of Idaho Rule of Evidence
404(b) provided by this Court in Joy, the factual differences and the number of years
between the conduct alleged in count two and that alleged in counts one and three
make it clear that joinder was legally improper. Aside from the large amount of time
between the incident involving J.B. and K.B. (seven to eight years), the difference in
relationships between Mr. Bower and the alleged victims (K.B. is Mr. Bower's daughter,
while J.B. is the daughter of Mr. Bower's former long-term girlfriend), and the difference
in the conduct alleged (one proceeded to full-blown intercourse, while the other involved
manual-to-genital contact), Mr. Bower notes that the age differences between the two
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alleged victims, approximately three years, especially in light of the ages that they were,
compels a finding that count two was improperly joined with counts one and three. 4
Regardless of whether it is the factual differences themselves or the lack of any
evidence that the conduct alleged to have been committed against J.B. in 2004 was part
of a plan to commit the charged offenses against K.B. in 2011 and 2012, the denial of
Mr. Bower's motion to sever was erroneous. Mr. Bower maintains that, in light of the

nature of the charges and the testimony given by both alleged victims, it will be
impossible for the State to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no prejudice
occurred as a result of the improper joinder. 5 As such, the only appropriate remedy is
for this Court to vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for new,
separate trials.

4

One of the victims in this case, J.B., was 10 or 11 years old, whereas the more recent
victim, K.B., was 13 or 14 years old. (R., p.20.) In short, one victim was a teenager,
while the other was not.
5 The prejudice inherent in this type of case, with charges involving multiple victims
improperly joined, is summed up by a review of the transcript of a portion of the
examination of one member of the jury panel in voir dire:
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
A.

And so in a case like this, you wouldn't give Kyle a presumption of
innocence?
There's two victims?
Well, that's what they say.
I'd have a hard time, yeah ...
I'd just have a hard time believing somebody when two people
made the same accusation.

(Tr., p.232, L.14 - p.233, L.9.)
14

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bower respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. If
granted, Mr. Bower respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of
conviction, and remand this matter for separate trials.
DATED this 15111 day of April, 2015.

ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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